No compensation was ever paid to the detainees. In , a secret Armenian network based in Boston, named Nemesis, took the law into its own hands and hunted down and assassinated former Ottoman Ministers Talaat Pasha and Jemal Pasha as well as other Ottoman officials. Most recently, Mourad Topalian, former Chairman of the Armenian National Committee of America, was tried and convicted in federal court in Ohio of terrorist crimes associated with bombings in New York and Los Angles and with the attempted assassination of the Turkish Honorary Consul General in Philadelphia.
The Armenian youths whom Topalian directed and who conducted these attacks were recruited from the Armenian Youth Federation and Armenian Revolution Federation in Boston. FACT 7: The archives of many nations ought to be carefully and thoughtfully examined before concluding whether genocide occurred.
Armenian make frequent reference to the archives of many nations while carefully avoiding calls for the examination of those archives.
They know that no evidence of genocide has been found to date, as was the case in the Malta Tribunals. They also know that the national archives of several nations, including the U. Take, for example, the Armenian revolt in Van where at least 60, Muslims perished.
Though the evidence for this is overwhelming, the official archives of several countries mention only Christian deaths. Still, Armenian carefully avoid calls for the collection and examination of all records regarding the events in question. Such would include Ottoman records describing the activities of Armenian rebels and the Russian invaders whom they supported, as well as the archives of Germany, Russia, France, Britain, Iran, Syria and the United States.
Only those who fear the truth would limit the scope of an investigation. Jews did not demand the dismemberment of the nations in which they had lived.
By contrast, the Ottoman Armenians openly agitated for a separate state in lands in which they were numerically inferior. The Hunchak and Dashnak revolutionary organizations, which survive to this day, were formed expressly to agitate against the Ottoman government. Jews did not kill their fellow citizens in the nations in which they had lived. By contrast, the Ottoman Armenians committed massacres against local Muslims. By contrast, during World War I, Ottoman Armenians openly and with pride committed mass treason, took up arms, traveled to Russia for training, and sported Russian uniforms.
Others, non-uniformed irregulars, operated against the Ottoman government from behind the lines. Solemn tribunal at Nuremberg proved the guilt of the perpetrators of the Holocaust and sentences were carried out in accordance with agreed-upon procedures. By contrast, the Malta Tribunals, which were convened by the World War I victors, exonerated those alleged to have been responsible for the maladministration of the relocation policies.
Open Armenian-Nazi collaboration is evident in the activities of the th Armenian Battalion of the [Nazi] Wehrmacht, commanded by Drastamat Kanayan a. Anti-Jewish, pro-Nazi propaganda was published widely in the Armenian-language Hairenik daily and the weekly journal, Armenian.
Hitler did not refer to the Armenians in plotting the Final Solution; the infamous quote is fraudulent. All sources attribute the alleged quote, "Who remembers the Armenians? The Times of London author claims the speech was introduced as evidence during the November 23, session of the Nuremberg Tribunal. Yet the Nuremberg transcripts do not contain the alleged quote.
Lochner, like the Times of London author, never disclosed his source. Instead, it entered into evidence two official versions of the August 22, address found in captured German military records.
Neither document contains any reference to Armenians, nor in fact do they refer to the Jews. The depth, breadth, and volume of scholarship on the Holocaust are tremendous.
The physical and documentary evidence is vast and proves indisputably the aims, methods, and results of the racist Nazi policies. By contrast, scholarship on the late Ottoman Empire is comparatively scarce. Much research has yet to be completed and many conclusions have yet to be drawn. Non-biased research from that period has thus far revealed tragedies afflicting all sides in a conflict with numerous belligerents.
Nothing has yet been uncovered which establishes genocide. In light of the ongoing research and the other distinctions raised above, it would be improper, if not malicious, to equate a desire to challenge Armenian assertions with Holocaust denial. However, victims of the mass killings also included some of the 1.
How did the mass killings start? By , Ottoman authorities were already portraying Armenians as a threat to the empire's security. Then, on the night of April , , the authorities in Constantinople, the empire's capital, rounded up about Armenian intellectuals and community leaders. Many of them ended up deported or assassinated. Friday is the th anniversary of that day. How many Armenians were killed? This is a major point of contention.
Estimates range from , to 2 million deaths between and , with not all of the victims in the Ottoman Empire. But most estimates -- including one of , between and , made by Ottoman authorities themselves -- fall between , and 1. Whether due to killings or forced deportation, the number of Armenians living in Turkey fell from 2 million in to under , by How did they die?
After he enters the guilty pleas to the two felony offenses, Stepanyan will face a statutory maximum sentence of 15 years in federal prison.
Chalikyan is scheduled to go on trial in this matter on Oct. He has pleaded not guilty to one count of conspiracy and five hate crime charges. Assistant U. Justice News Department of Justice. Wednesday, September 8, The November agreement potentially opens up an opportunity to envisage the South Caucasus anew, with new transport connections and economic cooperation possible for the first time since the Soviet era. There are plans for a restored road and rail connection between Nakhichevan and the rest of Azerbaijan via Armenia.
Armenians may also be able to travel from Yerevan to southern Armenia and Iran via Nakhichevan, a much easier route than the highland roads of Armenia. All this, however, will be difficult without political rapprochement.
This calls for a triple agenda of assisting the huge task of reconstructing and resettling the de-occupied Azerbaijani territories, providing assistance to Armenian-administered Nagorny Karabakh, and supporting region-wide transport links and economic connectivity.
The Azerbaijani leadership has so far made commitments only to a few high-profile projects there. Aliyev has already initiated a new six-lane kilometer highway from Fizuli to Shusha.
He has laid the foundation stone of a new international airport in Fizuli and said that it would start operating in He announced that a second new airport would be built in Kelbajar or Lachin District. These announcements look rather premature, preceding the launch of a wider program for the territories or any public consultation on how this will happen.
It documents plans to rebuild settlements over 11, square kilometers and resettle up to , people. An extensive program of demining, refurbishment of utilities, and reconstruction is needed before former residents can return, something that could take several years. How can all this be paid for? Azerbaijan is in a difficult economic climate , weathering the problems of falling oil production and modest international oil prices, as well as the costs of the global pandemic.
It is unlikely to be able to afford these projects on its own. Azerbaijan also has a record of systemic corruption, which makes it unlikely that all the money in a massive reconstruction project would be spent scrupulously. This is where the EU, UN agencies, and international financial institutions such as the World Bank, European Investment Bank, and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development could pledge funding, as well as the expertise they have accumulated in other postconflict situations such as the Balkans.
Previously, Azerbaijan has sought to restrict international access to Karabakh itself but could be prevailed upon to rethink this policy if this access is part of a wider international economic assistance program for the de-occupied territories, harnessed to an agenda of normalizing relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Gas and electricity supplies have been reduced. Its two main towns, Stepanakert which Azerbaijanis call Khankendi and Shusha or Shushi , which used to rely on one another for water and electricity, are now in rival hands. The newly liberated Azerbaijani Kelbajar and Lachin Districts are also likely to struggle to survive economically, unless they can get energy resources and goods from Armenia and Karabakh.
Economic connectivity needs to be seen to work for all. In a sign of potential trouble, Armenian villagers in Karabakh blocked a highway on January 18 to prevent a convoy of Azerbaijani trucks with a Russian escort from crossing their territory to Kelbajar District, in protest of the fact that those same villagers had been unable to use the road to travel to Armenia since November The Karabakh dispute sits deeply in the consciousness of two societies.
A second area where European actors in particular can play a role is the much longer-term ambition of fostering dialogue and reconciliation between Armenians and Azerbaijanis. There was much unfinished business from the first Karabakh conflict, including unpunished war crimes. The conflict has created new festering problems, such as the displacement of Karabakh Armenians from their homes and the disappointment of Azerbaijanis from Lachin District that they were unable to return home.
If left unaddressed, these issues could lead to new violence in the future. Narratives are set from above. Unless there is a decision by leaders to change official discourses, end hate speech, and reset old narratives, little is likely to change in stories of hatred and bitterness repeated in societies and the media.
The only groups who challenge these narratives were a few brave civil society activists and intellectuals.
A crackdown in Azerbaijan forced many of these individuals to leave the country and their number on both sides was further reduced by the recent war. In the past, these civil society initiatives received funding from an EU initiative, the European Partnership for the Peaceful Settlement of the Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh.
It will take time to rebuild these links. In the meantime, work is probably most needed on internal dialogue and discussion within both societies. Perhaps the most hopeful prospects for cross-border cooperation are for business groups, a constituency that now has a chance to work together as never before.
Armenian-Azerbaijani reconciliation is a long-term project, but international actors should still put their support behind it now. That will show the parties to the conflict their commitment to a sustainable peace.
It will also seize a moment when this often-forgotten conflict is still relatively high on the international agenda. On November 10, , a Russia-brokered ceasefire agreement halted a forty-four-day-long Armenia-Azerbaijan war over the disputed territory of Nagorny Karabakh.
The agreement reads:. As agreed by the Parties, within the next three years, a plan will be outlined for the construction of a new route via the Lachin Corridor, to provide a connection between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia, and the Russian peacemaking forces shall be subsequently relocated to protect the route.
The Republic of Azerbaijan shall guarantee the security of persons, vehicles and cargo moving along the Lachin Corridor in both directions. As agreed by the Parties, new transport links shall be built to connect the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic and the western regions of Azerbaijan.
Corrections: In the third paragraph, reference to Armenian settlers has been changed to reflect that they left Armenian-occupied districts outside Nagorny Karabakh, rather than Nagorny Karabakh itself. The article generally uses place names used at the start of the conflict in , for example, the names of the towns Shusha and Stepanakert.
This publication reflects the views of the author, and the European Commission is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains. Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author s and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
0コメント